Ideas from 'Necessity and Non-Existence' by Kit Fine [2005], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Modality and Tense' by Fine,Kit [OUP 2005,0-19-927871-7]].

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths

15063

Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence

15078

There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality

15072

Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact

15071

Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification

15075

Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier

15065

What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties

15076

Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity

15073

Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

15074

We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity

15064

Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence

15070

It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

15068

The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities

15069

Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time

15067

A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction

15077

It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series

15066

B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time